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Q: [On the probability of sending U.S. peacekeepers to the Golan Heights]
A: We have taken the position where we're prepared to do that step, what it takes to make this agreement work out. Given that we've taken that position, I think it's very likely we'll end up being asked [to do it]. The size of the force, and all of that, has yet to be discussed. But, the likelihood is that we will be asked, and we have already indicated that we would be willing to provide some sort of a force like that if requested.

Q: There seems to be some heavy-weight contrary opinion being mobilized. People think that something could get lost up there. We wouldn't have control [inaudible].
A: There's no risk-free operation for peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, but I don't see where this is any more dangerous than any other peacekeeping operation we've contemplated.

Q: Another Sinai? A well tested model...
A: Probably, it's somewhere between having peacekeeping forces in the Sinai and having them in a more vulnerable place like Gaza.

Q: The Sinai was probably not as emotional a place as Golan. I recall the Golan in 1975 or 1976, [inaudible] negotiate peace. The Israelis...
A: The Sinai is not an emotional place, now, but it was at one time. I would hope the Golan--we could be looking out five or ten years from now and saying the Golan is not an emotional place either.

Q: I don't think the Israeli settlers in the Sinai had the same commitment as the settlers in Golan.
A: Yeah.

Q: Who are we worried about in the Golan? Are we looking one way, are we looking two ways?

A: That's a good question.

Q: I have in mind the impulse which led the Israelis to [inaudible]. ...a little more quiet time up there. There's still a strategic consideration for Israel, is it not? To have military options, [inaudible] options?

A: What we have to weigh against those problems and risks, is the possibility that they really can move forward in the peace process in the Middle East. With all the problems we are looking at, right now, we can look back, at least, to the Israeli/Egypt peace agreement and say, "That that really worked, and it worked against pretty heavy odds at that time, too."

I don't mean to say that the technical problems in implementing it are the same, but the stakes are equally high. The advantage of moving forward with this is sufficiently high--that the United States has made a commitment to support that process with peacekeeping forces in the area, if that is required.

Q: We've got a cease-fire, that's been monitored by the UN for years now, and it's worked pretty well, because both sides wanted it to work well. They signed an agreement [inaudible]...

Q: If you get involved in enforcing the peace in the Middle East--and one of the parties [inaudible] still has visions of a greater Israel, and they haven't given them up--don't you run the risk of running afoul of Israeli domestic politics?

A: I think we're, more generally--more generally, the problem that I see there is that the Israelis have nothing like a common mind themselves in what they want in a peace agreement. The schism between the settlers on the one hand, for example, as Steve was suggesting, and the government's position that they want to move forward in the peace process. This is a division, a disagreement, the schism among the Israeli people are very deep on this issue. In many ways, that's one of the biggest problems we would have in trying to enforce any kind of a peace agreement. It's reflected by which direction you had to be protecting yourself from in the Golan.

We're also going to be enforcing a de marche just east of there, in the southern part of Iraq. As you know, we've been enforcing a de marche in the no-fly zone there for years. This is an interesting complication adding to that prohibition against reentry of Republican Guard forces south of that 32nd Parallel. That means we will have to, first of all, monitor that zone for ground traffic, as well as for air traffic; and secondly, be prepared to take military action against ground traffic if there are violations of it. That is, if they enter, a battalion or brigade of Republican Guard forces. That adds a new and very different dimension to our

enforcement in southern Iraq. That's not a consequence of the UN Resolution, it's a consequence of the de marche, which the U.S. and the United Kingdom [inaudible].

We are now putting together the air force that will be required to implement that de marche.

Q: Are you suggesting there is some connection between the southern Iraq situation and the Golan situation?

A: No, I'm not. I was just changing the subject. [Laughter]

Q: He's moving towards Korea.

Q: What is the answer to the question that you posed? How are we going to prepare for this extra measure of duty [inaudible]?

A: We will add more close surveillance--surveillance and ground strike capability into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for the purpose of implementing the provision. We have primarily air surveillance and air-to-air capability right now, because that's what we've been enforcing to this point, but we will have to augment that to deal with a different kind of surveillance.

Q: Do you consider us temporarily dispatched there, or permanently dispatched to that region?

A: "Permanent," is probably too big a word, but we're certainly talking about many months.

Q: But not many years.

A: We've been doing Southern Watch for several years, so we might end up doing this for several years. What you have to postulate is when the political situation in Iraq is going to change sufficiently that we do not consider Republican Guard forces moving south as a threat to Kuwait any more. To us, it's better to have a squadron or two of aircraft enforce that prohibition than it is to have to move 60,000 or 100,000 or 200,000 troops over there on short notice to respond to the buildup after it's occurred. That's difficult and expensive, particularly to move armored forces 7,000 miles in a few days.

Q: Do you have a squadron of [inaudible] aircraft?

A: We'll probably end up with two squadrons.

Q: And that would be sufficient to deter any Iraqi [inaudible] going on?

A: It would be sufficient to deter me if I were an Iraqi Republican Guard battalion. It's a very powerful force, and they're very vulnerable to that kind of attack--particularly in the process of deploying.

Q: And we've made it clear that if they should move, we would not feel obliged to get any UN "OK."

A: Yes, we have. And indeed, that's exactly, that's the way, the analogy here to Southern Watch where our ultimatum, our de marche, was based on a UN resolution but is not itself a UN resolution. Also, in Southern Watch, we consider ourselves free to take military action without any further reference. We have shot down airplanes that have violated that [inaudible], and we continue to be prepared to do that.

Q: So, if this works, you won't get caught in a yo-yo back and forth across the Atlantic, as he moves tanks south... This would prevent that.

A: We're trying to avoid the yo-yo by deterring him from bringing these troops across south of the 32nd Parallel to begin with. This will be a powerful deterrent to them. If that succeeds, then that will not have to be in this process of moving troops back and forth.

Q: Did it surprise you that the Iraqis were not deterred this time just by our air power?

A: I'm just not very good at reading Saddam Hussein's mind. He makes some decisions which I just think are completely inexplicable. I can't imagine what was in his mind this time. Why there was not an existential deterrence, without having to actually move the airplanes over there... Evidently he thought that--it was possible he thought we were distracted in Haiti or distracted somewhere else, that we didn't have the political will to act. I don't think he could have doubted that we had the military capability.

Q: Can we move to North Korea? Can we estimate how much they have to open their society--militarily, economically, in engineering terms--to comply with this agreement [inaudible]?

A: They don't have to open it very much to comply with the agreement. They have to open it a lot to take advantage of some of the provisions that [they agreed to]. For example, there's an agreement--we agreed to open up the possibility of trade, and even an agreement for a provision of North/South political dialogue. Neither of those require anything to happen in terms of opening up the society. But if they're taking advantage of the economic and political opportunities in this agreement, then they have to do that. Certainly the trade.... If they really want to get the benefits of the trade, then they're going to have the same problems the Chinese had years ago with having Westerners come into the country, and all of the problems of opening the society. Not just opening the society, but exposing people in their society to Western customs, to Western thoughts. But the agreement itself does not require that to happen. It just makes it possible for it to happen. They have to go a step beyond that and say we want to take full advantage of this agreement, full political and economic expansion. If they do that, then that openness is going to occur.

Q: Are they trying to get what they can out of the agreement [inaudible] tight controls of the society?

A: I think they're very serious about the hopes for some economic improvement out of this. But my point is, they will not get those benefits unless they're prepared.

Q: But you can't tell whether they've made that tradeoff in their own mind--we're prepared to open up in exchange for...

A: They have the Chinese example in front of them, and much discussion in the Communist world about the dangers and the risks of openness, and the tradeoffs between the economic benefits and the risks that come with it. So it's hard to believe that they would not have seen this issue and discussed it among themselves, and come to some sort of an explicit decision that it was worth taking the risk. Their economic situation is truly desperate.

Q: If that's the case, and this agreement does have a very long trigger--five years, [hard commitment], [inaudible]. Ten years, there's been some speculation, among people who know Korea well, that maybe this regime just can't last that long. What's your sense of how stable it is, and whether it will even last to implement it, unless it opens up?

A: We don't have any basis at all for making a judgment about--of coming to conclusions of instability in the regime. To put it another way, it seems to me you have to assume that there's a high degree of instability and that the regime [inaudible] more than a year or two. Certainly it would be a great surprise if it endured over the whole course of the agreement.

So, I've felt from the beginning of this agreement that we had to write the agreement in such a way that it did not make assumptions either about their willingness to comply with the agreement or about the ability of the regime to [inaudible] to the agreement. The agreement has to be bullet-proof in that respect. It has to be able to resist attempts to evade the agreement. It has to be able to stand up under an abrogation of the agreement. Even if the regime exists, they might elect to abrogate the agreement anywhere along the way. Finally, the regime might collapse. That, in itself, [inaudible] abrogation.

Q: "Agreement?" Is that because a "treaty" requires Senate approval?

A: A treaty does require Senate approval. This is an agreement instead of a treaty, though, for more reasons than that. It's an agreement that involves many nations to implement it. The most significant actions that are going to be taken under this agreement are putting together the organization that implements it and writing the contracts for the light water reactor, and funding those contracts. All of those are things to be done yet. This is not just an agreement. It's a framework agreement. It's a framework which will take us to legally binding action if we go forward. Those actions haven't been taken.

Q: What was the Chinese contribution to drawing the North Koreans into this agreement, if any?

A: I discussed this with a number of the Chinese officials. First of all, they are very clear that they do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. They're very clear for reasons that are easy to understand. Not that they think that North Korean nuclear weapons are a threat to them, but they are concerned that North Korea getting a nuclear weapon program would stimulate other countries in the region, particularly Japan, to get nuclear weapons. That would be a threat to them. So, they see a domino effect in the North Korean nuclear weapon program. Whether they're right in that reasoning is not a question, but that they're concerned about it is no doubt. So, they do not want North Korea to have a nuclear weapon program. They have made that explicitly clear to the North Koreans many times.

So, first of all, they don't want to have nuclear weapons. Secondly, they have said, and I believe them, that they have told that forcefully to the North Koreans. Third, they profess to have limited influence on the North Koreans. While I think that's probably true, limited relative to what? They probably have more influence than any other nation. Therefore, I've always thought that was important to get Chinese support on what we want to do with North Korea.

They not only have said they have discussed this with North Korea many times, but specifically, when we were in Beijing--Sunday and Monday--when it looked like the talks might break off, and I discussed this with the Chinese leaders, and asked them if they would take certain actions with North Korea, they agreed to do that. Again, they said, "We're not sure that our arguments will have the affect you desire." But, they were quite willing to do it.

Q: Those actions were what?

A: Well, I was contemplating that if the talks broke off, the North Koreans were saying they would then go back and start the reprocessing [inaudible] the reactor. I was going to get the Chinese to tell the North Koreans they'd better not do that or everybody [inaudible] a lot of trouble. Then [inaudible].

Q: That message was delivered?

A: That message I delivered to them. Hours later, literally hours later, we got word that the North Koreans had backed off and agreed to... The debate, the disagreement at that point was over including North/South dialogue in the agreement. The North Koreans were not willing to include that in the agreement and we insisted it be in the agreement.

The Chinese, incidentally, not only did not want the talks to break off, but they agreed with us on the merits that the North/South dialogue was a very

important feature. Whether they actually called them in that four or five hours, I don't know, but it's clear that they were willing to and prepared to.

I think it's a good example of how a constructive, working relationship with China can be useful. When you can identify an area where the action you want to take is not only in your interest, but arguably in the Chinese interest as well, you can get them to intervene. They would not have intervened against [inaudible], they would not [inaudible] a favor to us.

But in the absence of a relationship, they might not have had enough information to have intervened in a timely way.

Q: The payoff from MFN, is that what you're suggesting? This is a kind of a consequence down the road of having renewed most favored nation?

A: I think they just had a simple-minded interest. They did not want North Korea to have a nuclear weapons program. They thought the negotiations were [inaudible]. They wanted to promote the negotiations. They saw the negotiations possibly coming apart. They would have been willing to intervene, but [inaudible] forward. Again, for their own perception of their own national interest, not because they were trying to do us a favor.

Q: I'm getting ahead of events here, but having a two war [inaudible] force structure, [inaudible]. Is that two war scenario going to [inaudible]?

A: One of the two wars would be North Korea. The other was a Middle East conflict. You can imagine other places in the world where you might get into conflicts, but not on the scale, not in a size that would be fully taxing on our resources. Therefore if we thought that North Korea was not going to pose a security threat to us over the next decade, that would seriously reduce the impetus for a two war strategy.

The signing of this framework agreement by no means takes me to that position. It's an important step in that direction, but the steps ahead of us are even more important, and it's a long and difficult road ahead of us--even to get the implementation of this agreement, much less get us to the place where we do not feel that North Korea... This agreement says nothing about the one million man army that they've got lined up on their border. It does, however, and I get back to the point I made earlier, it does provide for political talks between the North and the South, and were those talks to be successful, it might lead to a degree of pacification on the Korean Peninsula which would greatly reduce the threat. It also leads to an opportunity for North Korea to make an advancement economically. They can't really take advantage of that as long as they are impoverishing their economy with the amount of money they spend to keep this million man army forward.

So if they want to take full advantage of moving forward economically, they have to make a dramatic reduction in the size of their conventional armed forces.

Were those things to happen two years, five years, seven years from now, then we might reach a stage sometime in the future where we say we do not see the threat from North Korea. But all that we have done at this point is take an important step towards removing the nuclear component of that threat, the conventional component which has been there for the last number of decades is still there. In fact, it's substantially more significant than it was just five years ago.

Q: Are we under some requirement, explicit or implicit, to go back to the Chinese if somehow the North Korean agreement starts to fall apart, and [inaudible] back to [inaudible] sanctions, if we thought that was in our interest. Do we have to go back to the Chinese? Under what terms would we go back to the Chinese [inaudible]?

A: Let me go back to last year and then work my way forward to the future. We've been at these negotiations now, really, for 17 months. They've broken down twice. The most recent time they broke down was just a few weeks ago over this North/South dialogue. That was a last minute breakdown and a last minute [fix]. But there was a major breakdown last June--the May and June time period -- when they started taking the fuel from their reactor and moving the fuel [inaudible] and not under IAEA control. At that point we broke off talks and were prepared to go to sanctions and prepared to go to substantial force augmentations in Korea. We were within probably a few days of taking that action when the Carter Initiative with Kim Il Sung produced the promise that Kim Il Sung would terminate his program in return for the light water reactor. From June to October, we actually negotiated the details of what that agreement was. But that was the position we were in last June.

A couple of points I want to make from that. As we looked at sanctions, we knew that in order to make them most effective we had to have Chinese cooperation. It wasn't just a matter of getting, that they could veto the sanction resolution at the UN. We still could have gone ahead with multinational sanctions on them which would have been moderately effective. China is a principal source of the import which is most important to them, which is their fuel. So if China were not willing to participate in sanctions, then we would only get a fraction of their effect. We would have gone ahead anyway.

In our discussions with China, first of all they were opposed to sanctions in principle, but more importantly, as a matter of substance, they were saying you're not being patient enough. You need to work these negotiations more carefully. And if you convince us that you've really exhausted attempts at negotiations, then if [inaudible] diplomacy, then we would get our sanctions.

To get back to your question. If the North Koreans now having made this agreement, which the Chinese have expressed great satisfaction with, if they now, a year from now, abrogated or violated, and then we go to sanctions, then I think we're in a very different position with the Chinese. We might very well get them to support an accurate sanction. They've already [inaudible] the Koreans back in line.

In this case what we'd be saying with sanctions, it would be for the specific purpose of forcing compliance with the agreement which has already been made.

Q: During the Haiti thing, President Carter appeared on television [and dropped that] he hadn't been in touch with the North Koreans "in the last few days." Is he [in this thing]? If so, what is his role now?

A: He is not interacting with our negotiating team. He may [have received a call] at some stage along the line, but no, he's not been a part of the negotiations. It's interesting that he may be in consultation with the North Korean side of the negotiations. I don't know that to be the case, but the way you phrased that suggests that...

Q: I believe I was quoting him.

Q: What are the North Korean problems on the proliferation side? It's not just their nuclear program, but their sales of missile technology elsewhere. Does this agreement include that problem? If it doesn't, what do you think our policy will be if we do detect some of their missile technology being sold in Iran, in Iraq, Syria, what have you? We did intercept a couple, didn't we, [on] ships? Or thought about it a year and a half ago or something like that?

A: We have a full set of problems with North Korea which this agreement doesn't even deal with. The sale of missile technology is one of them. The conventional weapons deployment is another. Acts of terrorism is another. We'll have to deal with those in the future just like we have in the past. This agreement doesn't deal with them. In my judgment, the agreement has a value in and of itself It deals with a problem which, while there are other problems that are important, it deals with nuclear weapons which I would say on an order of magnitude is more important than any of the other issues. Therefore, it's a great value to our security by having that nuclear weapons program terminated.

There is in the agreement [soft] provisions for political improvement and economic improvement. You can imagine that this creates an environment in which there might be improvement in those areas, but no guarantee at all. And if there is no improvement in those areas, we would still go ahead with... The more dangerous North Korea is in all other respects, the more we want to stop the nuclear weapons program.

That's been a hard concept for some people to understand. How can you deal with the North Koreans on this issue when they're doing other things you don't like? I guess my answer to that is, this is important in and of itself. And also, the more they're doing things I don't like, the more I care about stopping the nuclear weapons program.

Q: The North Koreans themselves don't consider the political positions to be [inaudible] for honoring that agreement? In other words, you seem to be saying that those political, the loosening of the trade elements are contingent upon other North Korean behaviors...

A: No, we offer those. But for the North Koreans to take full advantage of them, to get the benefit from them, it's not just enough to come to the North/South talks for dialogue. There has to actually be improvement. There's nothing in the agreement that forces the improvement, it just provides for the talks. But the North Koreans get no benefit out of that part of the agreement if they don't actually make some improvements.

If you argue that besides the direct benefit they get from the electricity that comes from the reactor, they would like to get improved political relationships and improved trade, then all this agreement does is give them an opportunity to move forward in those areas, but it doesn't force it. But if you were the North Korean leaders, you would think you'd want to take advantage of that.

The countervailing argument, though, is that if you take too much advantage of the opportunity to improve economic interchange, then you are opening up to Western ideas, Western people coming into the country. So whether they will fully take advantage of that or not, we don't know.

Q: Have you seen any further evidence recently of North Korean proliferation of missile technology?

A: No.

Q: There are a lot of carrots in the agreement, and when we were in Korea and Japan, there was talk in the press, and among some of the officials, about the reparations that North Korea wants from Japan. Whether or not they get the reparations, they clearly have to improve the political climate of their relationship with Japan for that even to be a remote possibility. So, there are strings that they would like to be able to pull on if the circumstances are right.

Q: Related to missile sales. There's new pressure to revive Star Wars [inaudible]. Do you know where that's coming from? Your predecessors, Scowcroft and [inaudible].

A: By "Star Wars" you mean a space-based anti-missile system?

Q: Yes.
A: I don't know. It's not coming from me.

Q: I wouldn't think it was coming from the Administration. Is there industry out there that [inaudible]?
A: There's certainly an industry out there that could benefit from Star Wars. I haven't felt that pressure myself, so I'm not quite sure where it's coming from.

Q: The President refers to it in a couple of speeches [inaudible].
A: I also would offer the opinion that it's going to go nowhere. We have a five year budget laid out which has no provision for that in it. It's a very tight budget. It's hard for me to imagine, even if there was some very strong pressure for doing this, [where do you put it in the budget]? I see it as a non-starter.

Q: On the same subject, Secretary Aspin when he made his anti-missile defense announcement, remember?
A: Right.

Q: He made the point that one of the things he was trying to accomplish was actually to [save] a missile technology portion of the budget from his own party because he deemed it important not just for the theater defense systems you have in the budget, but being able to maybe grow from that in the future. How important do you think that is to maintain? And are you bumping up against the ABM Treaty? Are you happy with the ABM Treaty the way it is?
A: We have what I consider a robust program in theater missile defense. That's not space-based, though. That's a ground-based system with a very different technology. It doesn't lend itself to expansion and maturation into a space-based system. So the ground-based shorter range ABM system that's well supported in the budget and will lead to a deployed system in our lifetime--not in some distant stage out in the future, but in our personal lifetime. But, there's very little in the budget for space-based missile systems--keeping such technology alive. There's nothing in space-based systems that is pointed to, or directed to, a deployment [inaudible].

If by "Star Wars" you mean space-based, there is nothing we are doing that is heading towards a deployed system in any conceivable time in the future. Whatever pressure that may be [inaudible] on that is, I think, not likely to succeed.

Q: [inaudible] political campaign, [inaudible].
A: I think it is necessary.

Q: The ABM Treaty?

A: Oh, the ABM Treaty. The question on theater missile defense systems causes certainly probably a minimum [inaudible] interpretation of the ABM Treaty because the ABM Treaty specifies that you can't have defenses against ICBMs, but it's permissible to have defenses against tactical missiles, theater missiles. The question is one of defining what systems you can have that fall within that agreement.

I think what is probably needed is a clarification of the ABM Treaty to be more specific about what constitutes an acceptable [inaudible], and... Technology, you can imagine, has a [spectrum], but not a sharp discontinuity as you go from one to the other, so you have to be fairly clear in defining what systems are allowable and what systems are not allowable. That clarification has not been done, and it needs to be done bilaterally. It needs to be done by both sides that signed the treaty. We do have discussions underway in that regard. I expect we'll have some clarification in the months ahead.

Q: Bosnia. [inaudible]

A: The strategy we're pursuing now to try to get acceptance of the peace plan, we already have it accepted by the Bosnian government. What we're doing is putting pressure on the Serbs, the Bosnian-Serbs for compliance. That is two different [natures]. First of all, by having the Serbs cut off the flow of war materiel to the Bosnian-Serbs. Our involvement and NATO's involvement, UN involvement in that -- I should say not NATO, but our involvement and the UN's involvement, is to assist in the monitoring on the border to stop whatever leakage they may be [inaudible].

The Russians are assisting--supporting us in that regard. Their opinion--the opinion of Minister Grachev, when I talked to him about this, is that if you're successful in cutting off those supplies, that the Bosnian Serbs will be in a desperate situation relative to [inaudible], and that is just a month or two. I'm not sure they're right about that point, but that is their opinion. So that's one way of putting pressure on the Bosnian-Serbs to accept an agreement which they do not otherwise like.

The other way is through more robust use of NATO air power, and in that regard, I made a proposal at the last Defense Minister's meeting which was accepted by NATO and was recently accepted by the UN, which says that if the UN... If UNPROFOR called for NATO air support that the specified conditions under which we would supply it would more or less guarantee that it would be a robust and effective response--not some of the rhetoric...

Q: [You would consider it].

A: That is now agreed to by the United Nations, that the NATO conditions under which they would supply their air support are now acceptable at the UN. So we now have an agreement. If the next time, then, there is a Serb provocation which calls for NATO air power, we will supply it in a vigorous fashion, not in the way it's been applied in the past. The volatile target, volatile aircraft, no warning to the targets on the ground, and applied in a timely way.

So, the combination, then, of a more robust use of NATO air power, and stopping the flow of materiel, that gives pressure on the Bosnian-Serbs which we are hoping will cause them to accept the peace plan. If they do that within the next six months, then the question would be lifting the sanctions [inaudible]. If they don't, then we're faced with another dilemma which is the congressional language in that regard. The language, though, only means all we've agreed to at this point is that we have to go back and consult with Congress at that point about a unilateral lifting. I am very clear on the point that I thin unilateral lifting of the embargo is a bad idea.

Q: Would the new rules for a quicker, more forceful NATO response to the UN request have the effect of making the UN even more reluctant to make a request?

A: Quite possibly. I have discussed this at some length with General Rose and General de La Presle and Mr. Akashi who would be the ones who pull the trigger, who make the request. I think there will be some cases where they would have been willing to have called for a one airplane sort of token strike, that they will not be able to call for now. But when they want support, they will have to take it that way.

Q: Would we not be in a better position to get our views and [inaudible] response to put into action if we do have peacekeepers on the ground?

A: We have not... Our views on what we wanted done in this case, for example, were accepted without our having troops on the ground.

We had a long debate about the use of air power over there, and the argument was made by both the British and the French that we're not in a strong position to be recommending what to do because we don't have troops on the ground. But in the last analysis, our arguments carried anyway, and they carried because both the British and the French also cared about having NATO be seen as an effective military arm and not be involved in operations which would seem to be [reckless].

Q: But you're acknowledging that [inaudible] may be even slower to [inaudible]. So effectively the gain in the agreement you describe is a diminutia in the actual military...

A: No, I said something different than that, I believe. Let me be more clear about what my point is. If there are a set of circumstances out there which would call for the use of air power, if the circumstances, if all they wanted was a token show of air power, that was the appropriate response, then they would not call for it because we're not going to give them a token use of air power. So in those circumstances, they'd get no air power at all. The circumstances where they really need air power and call for it, they will then get this robust response. So there will be some circumstances that they might have called for that they now won't call for. When they do call for it, they'll get a full measure.

I don't think that's a loss. I don't think we gain anything, and certainly we did not make any substantial impression on the Bosnian-Serbs by these token shows of air force. I think we'll be ahead of the game in giving up that token showing altogether.

Whether or not they call for a significant use of air power I think will depend on what kind of provocations occur. We'll have to wait and see.

Q: Do you have any sense of how morale is among the Force now with these deployments? The President was not very popular when he first came in. [inaudible]. Has the Force calmed down a bit from the early days?

A: I've spent a lot of my time out in the forces, both stationed in the United States and overseas. I come away with the uniform impression that morale is very high; the capability of the Force... So I'm commenting both on morale and on readiness. I'm talking both about the response of the commanders in the field and the troops that I talked with there.

On a few of these visits I've been with the President, and he's gotten nothing but a warm and enthusiastic response. Most recently in our trip down to Norfolk, we went out on the EISENHOWER. I've never seen such an enthusiastic, outpouring of warmth.

I think this is a--whatever the validity of that impression has been in the first year, at least, in the time that I've been Secretary, when I've gone out and gone out with the President, I haven't seen any basis for that, at all. That's as close as I can make an objective assessment. I've been looking for that [inaudible] because that would be a problem for me, and I just don't see it. I read about it occasionally, but I don't see it. There's no evidence in my trips to the field to support that.

My own response I get myself as the Secretary is very warm, very positive, and I've sampled that on dozens and dozens of trips to thousands and thousands of soldiers. So, if there's a problem out there, I sure don't see it.

Let me go back briefly to the North Korea framework agreement, and just make a few summary points on it. First, is it needs to be evaluated in terms of the real alternative. Not in terms of some other agreement that somebody else might have been able to negotiate. The real alternative was the one we were facing last June--going to sanctions, going to a substantial increase in our force. You can look at that both in terms of whatever risk of war they might have had to take [with those] actions. And you can look at it in terms of the cost you would have had in terms of the additional funds that we were contemplating.

The second point about it is that the principal feature, I think, from my point of view, and the feature which I have always insisted be in the agreement, is the freeze. I mention that because it was hard to get the North Koreans to agree to that. That was almost the last thing that they agreed to. They didn't want a freeze for obvious reasons. They wanted to maintain the option of keeping this program going. The reason the freeze was so important is because if at any time along the line, because we don't have any confidence about what might happen in the government, or whether they might abrogate it, or whether they're just playing games. If they abrogate this or walk away from it two years from now, my test of this agreement is that there would not be any advantage to that. In order for us to be able to answer that positively, there has to be a freeze. They're not moving their program forward during that two year period or during the three year period.

So, in looking at what they might do--looking at the "what if" side--the most important feature in the agreement is the freeze, which means that what happens if they abrogate two years from now or four years from now is that they are--from a security point of view, we are just as well off then as we are now. Indeed, we're better off because in the meantime they have started to get some benefits from us. Those benefits are benefits which they're going to become dependent on. The oil supply, the economic benefits. Therefore, for them, they gain nothing by abrogating in a couple of years, and what they lose is the potential for really... First of all, the main benefit of the electricity from the light water reactor, that doesn't kick in until the very end of the program, so they've lost that, forfeited that. They get cut off at that point on any oil supplies they are getting. They lose the economic benefits, they lose the potential political benefits.

So, on the one hand, we have enough transparency that we see no danger of them abrogating the agreement. On the other hand, if they abrogate the agreement, there's no benefit to them and no loss to our security. The worse we are is back to where we are now or back to where we were last June where we then have to face again the question of going to sanctions. At that point, going to sanctions is more likely to get much stronger support from the international community, because now they would have been clearly in violation of the agreement.

The other point that I'd make to you is the one that I made to the South Koreans and the Japanese when I talked to them. We do not see any basis in the agreement for decreasing our security commitment to South Korea and Japan or decreasing the number of Forces we have deployed in South Korea and Japan. We intend to maintain our commitment and maintain our Forces in those areas, for the reason which I described earlier. They're there to deal with a conventional threat which as of this point has not changed, and this agreement has no direct requirement for them to change that. It can create an environment which will permit them to, will encourage them to make a reduction in force. If that happens, then that's something we will consider at that time.

The other point to be made, because this has been, I think, misunderstood, in some of the media reporting, is that what they have signed up to in this agreement goes well, well beyond the NPT or the IAEA agreements. There's no requirement in any of the provisions for freezing the program; there's no requirement for dismantling those facilities. All of those facilities are entirely legal, as long as they allow the IAEA inspectors to check them. So, they could be sitting over there accumulating hundreds of [inaudible], and be doing that within the NPT or doing that within the IAEA inspection. So, what they have agreed to do goes well beyond anything that they're obligated to do under the commitments they've made in the past, on the basis of the NPT. That's basically what we are buying with the light water reactor--their agreement to dismantle this program. Freeze it and then dismantle it, which they would have no requirement otherwise to do.

Q: Thank you, very much.
A: Thank you.

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